Abstract -In this paper we propose a new family of Belief Conditioning Rules (BCR) for belief revision. These rules are not directly related with the fusion of several sources of evidence but with the revision of a belief assignment available at a given time according to the new truth (i.e. conditioning constraint) one has about the space of solutions of the problem.
Introduction
In this paper we define several Belief Conditioning Rules (BCR) for use in information fusion and for belief revision. Suppose we have a basic belief assignment (bba) m 1 (.) defined on hyper-power set D Θ , and we find out that the truth is in a given element A ∈ D Θ . So far in literature devoted to belief functions and the mathematical theory of evidence, there has been used Shafer's Conditioning Rule (SCR) [2] , which simply combines the mass m 1 (.) with a specific bba focused on A, i.e. m S (A) = 1, and then uses Dempster's rule to transfer the conflicting mass to non-empty sets. But in our opinion this conditioning approach based on the combination of two bba's is subjective since in such procedure both sources are subjective. While conditioning a mass m 1 (.), knowing (or assuming) that the truth is in A, means that we have an absolute (not subjective) information, i.e. the truth is in A has occurred (or is assumed to have occurred), thus A was realized (or is assumed to be realized), hence it is an absolute truth. "Truth in A" must therefore be considered as an absolute truth when conditioning, while m S (A) = 1 used in SCR does not refer to an absolute truth actually, but only to a subjective certainty in the possible occurrence of A given by a second source of evidence. This is the main and fundamental distinction between our approaches (BCRs) and Shafer's (SCR). In our opinion, SCR does not do a conditioning, but only a fusion of m 1 (.) with a particular bba m S (A) = 1. The main advantage of SCR is that it is simple and thus very appealing, and in some cases it gives the same results with some BCRs, and it remains coherent with conditional probability when m 1 (.) is a Bayesian belief assignment. In the sequel, we will present many (actually thirty one BCR rules, denoted BCR1-BCR31) new alternative issues for belief conditioning. The sequel does not count: a) if we first know the source m 1 (.) and then that the truth is in A (or is supposed to be in A), or b) if we first know (or assume) the truth is in A, and then we find the source m 1 ().The results of conditioning are the same. In addition, we work on a hyper-power set, that is a generalization of the power set. The best among these BCR1-31, that we recommend researchers to use, are: BCR17 for a pessimistic/prudent view on conditioning problem and a more refined redistribution of conflicting masses, or BCR12 for a very pessimistic/prudent view and less refined redistribution. After a short presentation of SCR rule, we present in the following sections all new BCR rules we propose, many examples, and a very important and open challenging question about belief fusion and conditioning.
Shafer's conditioning rule (SCR)
Before going further in the development of new belief conditioning rules, it is important to recall the conditioning of beliefs proposed by Glenn Shafer in [2] (p.66-67) and reported below.
So, let's suppose that the effect of a new evidence (say source 2) on the frame of discernment Θ is to establish a particular subset B ⊂ Θ with certainty. Then Bel 2 will give a degree of belief one to the proposition corresponding to B and to every proposition implied by it:
otherwise.
Since the subset B is the only focal element of Bel 2 , its basic belief assignment is one, i.e. m 2 (B) = 1. Such a function Bel 2 is then combinable with the (prior) Bel 1 as long as Bel 1 (B) < 1, and the Dempster's rule of combination (denoted ⊕) provides the conditional belief Bel 1 (.|B) = Bel 1 ⊕ Bel 2 (according to Theorem 3.6 in [2] ). More specifically, one gets for all A ⊂ Θ, where Pl(.) denotes the plausibility function.
Belief Conditioning Rules (BCR)
Let Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n }, n ≥ 2, and the hyper-power set 1 Let s(A) = {θ i1 , θ i2 , . . . , θ ip }, 1 ≤ p ≤ n, be the singletons/atoms that compose A (For example, if A = θ 1 ∪ (θ 3 ∩ θ 4 ) then s(A) = {θ 1 , θ 3 , θ 4 }.). We consider three subsets of D Θ \ ∅, generated by A:
, the parts of A which are included in the hyper-power set, except the empty set;
• D 2 = {(Θ \ s(A)), ∪, ∩} \ {∅}, i.e. the sub-hyper-power set generated by Θ \ s(A) under ∪ and ∩, without the empty set.
•
; each set from D 3 has in its formula singletons from both s(A) and Θ \ s(A) in the case when Θ \ s(A) is different from empty set. 
Examples of decomposition of D
Let's consider Θ = {A, B, C} and the free DSm model.
• If one supposes the truth is in A, then
i.e. D 1 contains all the parts of A which are included in D Θ , except the empty set. D 2 contains all elements which do not contain the letter A, i.e.
.e. In this case, sets whose formulas contain both the letters A and at least a letter from {B, C}.
• If one supposes the truth is in A ∩ B, then one has D1 = {A ∩ B, A ∩ B ∩ C}, D 2 = {C}; i.e. • If one supposes the truth is in A ∪ B, then one has D 1 = {A, B, A ∩ B, A ∪ B}, and all other sets included in these four ones, i.e.
i.e. D 2 elements do not contain the letters A, B and
• If one supposes the truth is in A ∪ B ∪ C, then one has • If one supposes the truth is in A ∩ B ∩ C, then one has 
We propose several Belief Conditioning Rules (BCR) for deriving a (posterior) conditioning belief assignment m(.|A) from a (prior) bba m(.) and a conditioning set A ∈ D Θ \ {∅}. For all forthcoming BCR formulas, of course we have:
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 1 (BCR1)
The Belief Conditioning Rule no. 1, denoted BCR1 for short, is defined for X ∈ D 1 by the formula
This is the easiest transfer of masses of the elements from D 2 and D 3 to the non-empty elements from D 1 . This transfer is done indiscriminately in a similar way to Dempster's rule transfer, but this transfer is less exact. Therefore the sum of masses of non-empty elements from D 2 and D 3 is transferred to the masses of non-empty elements from D 1 proportionally with respect to their corresponding non-null masses.
In a set of sets, such as
Θ , we consider the inclusion of sets, ⊆, which is a partial ordering relationship. The model of D Θ generates submodels for D 1 , D 2 and D 3 respectively. Let W ∈ D 3 . We say X ∈ D 1 is the k-largest, k ≥ 1, element from D 1 that is included in W , if: ∄Y ∈ D 1 \{X} with X ⊂ Y , and X ⊂ W . Depending on the model, there are k ≥ 1 such elements. Similarly, we say that X ∈ D 1 is the k-smallest, k ≥ 1, element from D 1 that is included in W , if: ∄Y ∈ D 1 \ {X} with Y ⊂ X, and X ⊂ W . Since in many cases there are k ≥ 1 such elements, we call each of them a k-smallest element.
We recall that the DSm Cardinal, i.e. Card DSm (X) for X ∈ D Θ , is the number of distinct parts that compose X in the Venn Diagram. It depends on the model and on the cardinal of Θ, see [3] for details. We partially increasingly order the elements in D 1 using the inclusion relationship and their DSm Cardinals. Since there are elements X, Y ∈ D 1 that are in no relationship with each other (i.e. X Y , Y X), but having the same DSm Cardinal, we list them together in a same class. We, similarly as in statistics, say that X is a k-median, k ≥ 1, element if X is in the middle of 
In D 1 , we have: the 1-largest element is B ∪ C; the k-smallest (herein 2-smallest) are B, C; the kmedian (herein 2-median) is the class of C, which is formed by the elements B, C; the k-average of 
One verifies easily that:
c) Let Θ = {A, B, C}, free DSm model, and the truth is in B. For the following BCR formulas, the k-largest, k-smallest, k-median, and k-average elements respectively are calculated only for those elements from D 1 that are included in a given W (where W ∈ D 3 ), not for the whole D 1 .
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 2 (BCR2)
In Belief Conditioning Rule no. 2, i.e. BCR2 for short, a better transfer is proposed. While the sum of masses of elements from D 2 is redistributed in a similar way to the non-empty elements from D 1 proportionally with respect to their corresponding non-null masses, the masses of elements from D 3 are redistributed differently, i.e. if W ∈ D 3 then its whole mass, m(W ), is transferred to the k-largest (with respect to inclusion from D 1 ) set X ⊂ W ; this is considered a pessimistic/prudent way. The formula of BCR2 for X ∈ D 1 is defined by:
or equivalently
where X is the k-largest (with respect to inclusion) set included in W . The previous formula is actually equivalent in the Shafer's model to the following formula:
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 3 (BCR3)
The Belief Conditioning Rule no. 3, i.e. BCR3 is a dual of BCR2, but the transfer of m(W ) is done to the k-smallest, k ≥ 1, (with respect to inclusion) set X ⊂ W , i.e. in an optimistic way. The formula of BCR3 for X ∈ D 1 is defined by:
where X is the k-smallest, k ≥ 1, (with respect to inclusion) set included in W .
There are cases where BCR2 and BCR3 coincide, i.e. when there is only one, or none,
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 4 (BCR4)
In an average between pessimistic and optimistic ways, we can consider "X k-median" in the previous formulas in order to get the Belief Conditioning Rule no. 4 (BCR4), i.e. for any X ∈ D 1 ,
where X is a k-median element of all elements from D 1 which are included in W . Here we do a medium (neither pessimistic nor optimistic) transfer.
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 5 (BCR5)
We replace "X is k-median" by "X is k-average" in BCR4 formula in order to obtain the BCR5, i.e. for any
where X is a k-average element of all elements from D 1 which are included in W . This transfer from D 3 is also medium and the result close to BCR4's.
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 6 (BCR6)
BCR6 does a uniform redistribution of masses of each element W ∈ D 3 to all elements from D 1 which are included in W , i.e. for any
where
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 7 (BCR7)
In our opinion, a better (prudent) transfer is done in the following Belief Conditioning Rule no. 7 (BCR7) defined for any X ∈ D 1 by:
Or, simplified we get:
The transfer is done in the following way:
• the sum of masses of elements in D 2 are redistributed to the non-empty elements from D 1 proportionally with respect to their corresponding non-null masses (similarly as in BCR1-BCR6 and BCR8-BCR11 defined in the sequel);
• for each element W ∈ D 3 , its mass m(W ) is distributed to all elements from D 1 which are included in W and whose masses are non-null proportionally with their corresponding masses (according to the second term of the formula (12));
• but, if all elements from D 1 which are included in W have null masses, then m(W ) is transferred to the k-largest X from D 1 , which is included in W (according to the last term of the formula (12)); this is the pessimistic/prudent way.
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 8 (BCR8)
A dual of BCR7 is the Belief Conditioning Rule no. 8 (BCR8), where we consider the optimistic/more specialized way, i.e. "X is k-largest" is replaced by "X is k-smallest", k ≥ 1 in (12). Therefore, BCR8 formula for any X ∈ D 1 is given by :
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 9 (BCR9)
In an average between pessimistic and optimistic ways, we can consider "X k-median" in the previous formulas (12) and (13) instead of "k-largest" or "k-smallest" in order to get the Belief Conditioning Rule no. 9 (BCR9).
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 10 (BCR10)
BCR10 is similar to BCR9 using an average transfer (neither pessimistic nor optimistic) from D 3 to D 1 . We only replace "X k-median" by "X k-average" in BCR9 formula.
Belief Conditioning Rule no. 11 (BCR11)
BCR11 does a uniform redistribution of masses of D 3 to D 1 , as BCR6, but when S(W ) = 0 for W ∈ D 3 . BCR11 formula for any X ∈ D 1 is given by:
More Belief Conditioning Rules (BCR12-BCR21)
More versions of BCRs can be constructed that are distinguished through the way the masses of elements from D 2 ∪ D 3 are redistributed to those in D 1 . So far, in BCR1-11, we have redistributed the masses of D 2 indiscriminately to D 1 , but for the free and some hybrid DSm models of D Θ we can do a more exact redistribution.
There are elements in D 2 that don't include any element from D 1 ; the mass of these elements will be redistributed identically as in BCR1-. But other elements from D 2 that include at least one element from D 1 will be redistributed as we did before with D 3 . So we can improve the last ten BCRs for any X ∈ D 1 as follows:
Surely, other combinations of the ways of redistributions of masses from D 2 and D 3 to D 1 can be done, obtaining new BCR rules.
Examples

Example no. 1 (free DSm model with non-Bayesian bba)
Let's consider Θ = {A, B, C}, the free DSm model (no intersection is empty) and the following prior bba
and let's assume that the truth is in B ∪ C, i.e. the conditioning term is B ∪ C. Then:
We recall that ∀X ∈ D Θ , the DSm Cardinal of X, Card DSm (X), is equal to the number of distinct parts that compose X in the Venn Diagram (see below) according to the given model on D Θ . By definition, Card DSm (∅) = 0 (see [3] for examples and details). 
One verifies easily that: Finally, one gets with BCR1-based conditioning: 
is, in each case, redistributed to the k-smallest D 1 element, which is A ∩ B ∩ C (1-smallest herein). Hence:
In BCR4, we use k-median.
• A ∪ B includes the following D 1 elements:
Hence we take the whole class:
e. 3-medians; each one receiving 1/3 of 0.1 = m 1 (A ∪ B).
• A ∪ (B ∩ C) includes the following D 1 elements:
Hence we take the left and right (to the median) classes:
i.e. 6-medians, each ones receiving 1/6 of 0.1 = m 1 (A ∪ (B ∩ C)).
Totalizing, one finally gets:
e) In BCR5, we compute k-average, i.e. the k-average of DSm cardinals of the D 1 elements included in eack W ∈ D 3 .
• For A ∪ B, using the results got in BCR4 above: Totalizing, one finally gets:
f) In BCR6, the k-average is replaced by uniform redistribution of D 3 elements' masses to all D 1 elements included in each W ∈ D 3 .
• The mass m 1 (A ∪ B) = 0.1 is equally split among each D 1 element included in A ∪ B (see the list of them in BCR4 above), hence 1/10 of 0.1 to each.
• Similarly, m 1 (A ∪ (B ∩ C)) = 0.1 is equally split among each D 1 element included in A ∪ (B ∩ C), hence 1/8 of 0.1 to each.
• And, in the same way, m 1 (A ∪ B ∪ C) = 0.1 is equally split among each D 1 element included in A ∪ B ∪ C, hence 1/13 of 0.1 to each.
is also indiscriminately redistributed, but m(D 3 ) is redistributed in a different more refined way.
• The mass m 1 (A ∪ B) = 0.1 is transferred to B and B ∩ A since these are the only D 1 elements included in A ∪ B whose masses are non-zero, proportionally to their corresponding masses, i.e. • m 1 (A ∪ (B ∩ C)) = 0.1 is transferred to B ∩ A only since no other D 1 element with non-zero mass is included in A ∪ (B ∩ C).
• m 1 (A ∪ B ∪ C) = 0.1 is similarly transferred to B, C, B ∩ A, B ∪ C, i.e. 
is redistributed to the 1-smallest, i.e. to A ∩ B ∩ C and m(D 3 ) is redistributed as in BCR3. Therefore one gets: 
, is redistributed to the k-averages.
Hence each of B ∩ C, C ∩ A receives 1/2 of 2; m(D 3 ) is redistributed as in BCR5. Therefore one gets: 
In the free DSm model, if the truth is in A, BCR12 gives the same result as m 1 (.) fusioned with m 2 (A) = 1 using the classic DSm rule.
Example no. 2 (Shafer's model with non-Bayesian bba)
Let's consider Θ = {A, B, C} with Shafer's model and the following prior bba:
Let's assume as conditioning constraint that the truth is in B ∪ C. D Θ is decomposed into
The Venn Diagram corresponding to Shafer's model for this example is given in Figure 2 below. Table 1 : Conditioning results based on BCRs given the truth is in C ∪ D.
Let's examine the conditional bba obtained directly from the fusion of the prior bba m 1 (.) with the belief assignment focused only on C ∪ D, say m 2 (C ∪ D) = 1 using three main rules of combination (Dempster's rule, DSmH and PCR5). After elementary derivations, one gets final results given in Table 2 . In the Bayesian case, all BCRs and Shafer's conditioning rule (with Dempster's rule) give the same result. 
Classification of the BCRs
Let's note: D Thus, we can organize and classify the BCRs as in Table 3 . Other belief conditioning rules could also be defined according to Table 4 . But in our opinions, the most detailed and exact transfer is done by BCR17. So, we suggest to use preferentially BCR17 for a pessimistic/prudent view on conditioning problem and a more refined redistribution of conflicting masses, or BCR12 for a very pessimistic/prudent view and less refined redistribution. If the Shafer's models holds for the frame under consideration, BCR12-21 will coincide with BCR2-11. In summary, the best among these BCR1-31, that we recommend to use, are: BCR17 for a pessimistic/prudent view on conditioning problem and a more refined redistribution of conflicting masses, or BCR12 for a very pessimistic/prudent view and less refined redistribution. BCR12 is simpler than BCR17. BCR12 can be regarded as a generalization of SCR from the power set to the hyper-power set in the free DSm free model (all intersections non-empty). In this case the result of BCR12 is equal to that of m 1 (.) combined with m 2 (A) = 1, when the truth is in A, using the DSm Classic fusion rule.
Ways of redistribution Belief Conditioning Rule Specific Elements
6 Properties for all BCRs 
This can be proven from the fact that X∈D Θ m(X) = 1. and 
Open question on conditioning versus fusion
It is not to difficult too verify that fusion rules and conditioning rules do not commute in general, except in Dempster-Shafer Theory because Shafer's fusion and conditioning rules are based on the same operator 2 (Dempster's rule), which make derivation very simple and appealing.
We however think that things may be much more complex in reality than what has been proposed up to now if we follow our interpretation of belief conditioning and do not see the belief conditioning as just a simple fusion of the prior bba with a bba focused on the conditioning event where the truth is (subjectively) supposed to be. From our belief conditioning interpretation, we make a strong difference between the fusion of several sources of evidences (i.e. combination of bba's) and the conditioning of a given belief assignment according some extra knowledge (carrying some objective/absolute truth on a given subset) on the model itself. In our opinion, the conditioning must be interpreted as a revision of bba according to new integrity constraint on the truth of the space of the solutions. Based on this new idea on conditioning, we are face to a new and very important open question which can be stated as follows 3 : Let's consider two prior bba's m 1 (.) and m 2 (.) provided by two (cognitively) independent sources of evidences defined on D Θ for a given model M (free, hybrid or Shafer's model) and then let's assume that the truth is known to be later on in a subset A ∈ D Θ , how to compute the combined conditional belief?
There are basically two possible answers to this question depending on the order the fusion and the conditioning are carried out. Let's denote by ⊕ the generic symbol for fusion operator (PCR5, DSmH or whatever) and by Cond(.) the generic symbol for conditioning operator (typically BCRs).
1. Answer 1 (Fusion followed by conditioning (FC)):
2. Answer 2 (Conditioning followed by the fusion (CF)):
Since in general 4 the conditioning and the fusion do not commute, m F C (.|A) = m CF (.|A), the fundamental open question arises: How to justify the choice for one answer with respect to the other one (or maybe with respect to some other answers if any) to compute the combined conditional bba from m 1 (.), m 2 (.) and any conditioning subset A?
The only argumentation (maybe) for justifying the choice of m F C (.|A) or m CF (.|A) is only imposed by the possible temporal/sequential processing of sources and extra knowledge one receives, i.e. if one gets first m 1 (.) and m 2 (.) and later one knows that the truth is in A then m F C (.|A) seems intuitively suitable, but if one gets first m 1 (.) and A, and later m 2 (.), then m CF (.|A) looks in better agreement with the chronology of information one has received in that case. If we make abstraction of temporal processing, then this fundamental and very difficult question remains unfortunately totally open. 
3 The question can be extended for more than two sources actually. 4 Because none of the new fusion and conditioning rules developed up to now satisfies the commutativity, but Dempster's rule. Let's suppose one finds out the truth is in A∪B and let's examine the results m CF (.|A∪B) and m F C (.|A∪B) obtained from either the conditioning followed by the fusion, or the fusion followed by the conditioning.
• Case 1 : BCRs-based Conditioning followed by the PCR5-based Fusion Using BCRs for conditioning, the mass m 1 (C) = 0.2 is redistributed to A and B proportionally to the masses 0. But this is a trivial result because in this specific case (Shafer's model with Bayesian bba's), we know (cf Property 5 in Section 6) that BCRs coincide with SCR and already know that SCR commutes with Dempter's fusion rule. Let's suppose one finds out the truth is in B∪C and let's examine the results m CF (.|B∪C) and m F C (.|B∪C) obtained from either the conditioning followed by the fusion, or the fusion followed by the conditioning. In this second example we only provide results for BCR12 and BCR17 since we consider them as the most appealing BCR rules. We decompose D Θ into D 1 = {B, C, B ∪ C}, D 2 = {A} and D 3 = {A ∪ B}.
• Case 1 : BCR12/BCR17-based Conditioning followed by the PCR5-based Fusion Using BCR12 or BCR17 for conditioning m 1 (.) and m 2 (.), one gets herein the same result with both BCRs for each conditional bba, i.e. From cases 1 and 2, one has proved that there exists at least one example for which PCR5 fusion and BCR12/17 conditioning rules do not commute since m FP CR5CBCR12/17 (.|B ∪ C) = m C BCR12/17 FP CR5 (.|B ∪ C).
• Case 3 : BCR12/BCR17-based Conditioning followed by Dempster's rule-based Fusion If we consider the same masses m 1 (.) and m 2 (.) and if we apply the BCR12 or BCR17 to each of them, one gets same result, i.e. 
